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Are banks’ below-par own debt repurchases a cause for prudential concern?
Abstract
Leading up to the implementation of Basel III, European banks repurchased debt securities that
traded below par. Banks are subjected to a prudential filter that excludes unrealized gains on liabili-
ties from changes in own credit standing from the calculation of capital ratios. By repurchasing debt
securities below par, unrealized gains become realized and increase Core Tier 1 capital. Using data
of 720 European Liability Management Exercises (LMEs) conducted between April 2009 and De-
cember 2013, we show that poorly capitalized banks repurchased securities and lost aboute9.1bn in
premiums to compensate debt holders. Banks also repurchased the most loss-absorbing securities,
for which they paid the highest premiums. These premiums increase with leverage and in times of
stress. Hence debt repurchases are a cause for prudential concern.
Keywords: banking, prudential filter, fair value option, below par, subordinated debt.
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Introduction
In the years 2009–2013, many European banks repurchased debt that traded below par with the pur-
pose of increasing their Core Tier 1 capital ratio. In anticipation of the new capital requirements
that would enter into force in 2014, banks repurchased these below-par debt securities to turn an
unrealized fair value gain into a realized one.1 Bank regulation excludes unrealized fair value gains
on debt securities arising from a deterioration in banks’ own credit standing from the calculation of
regulatory capital by means of a prudential filter. Even if banks wanted to use the fair value option
for liabilities, regulation prevented them from doing so to increase capital ratios. Banks thus had an
incentive to engage in Liability Management Exercises (LMEs), i.e., buybacks of debt capital secu-
rities that trade below par, as the unrealized gain then becomes realized and is included in regulatory
capital.2 Using data of unprecedented detail, we examine the determinants of 720 European LMEs
as well as their effects on solvency and liquidity. We also examine the determinants of the buyback
premium as a measure of the inefficiency of an LME, and the types of instruments that were bought
back.
In the years leading up to the implementation of Basel III in Europe (2009–2013), banks’ demand
for equity capital increased significantly. Whereas under Basel II rules banks could satisfy an 8%
capital requirement with 2% common equity over risk-weighted assets, under Basel III, the Com-
mon Equity Tier 1 requirement can be as high as 14.5%. Many European banks could not satisfy
these augmented capital requirements within relatively short notice through conventional methods.
Issuing shares, for example, was not practically possible for cooperatives and state-owned banks
and because of weak investor appetite. In addition, issuing shares dilutes existing shareholders,
especially when share prices are low. Alternatively, retaining profits would entail cutting dividend
payments, which would give a bad signal to investors. Moreover, retaining profits is only meaning-
1The unrealized gain is the difference between the accounting value of debt and the (lower) market value of debt.
2Regulatory adjustments applied to accounting equity to arrive at regulatory capital are often denoted with the term
“prudential filters.” Note that we use the term Liability Management Exercise, instead of “balance sheet management,”
given that this is a common term for these transactions (Slater, 2011).
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ful for profitable banks, but profitable banks were often less pressed to meet the increased capital
requirements. A third way to increase capital ratios would be to sell assets with high risk weights,
namely by “de-risking.” However, in the interest of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs),
European supervisors actively discouraged banks from de-risking as this would reduce lending to
SMEs (as evidenced by the EBA press release on the EBA recapitalization exercise and EBA’s 2013
recommendation on the preservation of capital (EBA, 2011b, 2013b)).
In the absence of alternative viable means to increase capital, many European banks responded
to the higher anticipated capital requirements by buying back debt that traded below par. These
banks actively managed their liabilities to realize gains on liabilities that originated from a weak
credit standing. To illustrate this, assume a bank faces a deteriorated credit standing. This results in
a potential gain on a debt security because increases in credit risk result in decreases in debt value.
In case the bank values the debt security at amortized cost, a repurchase at the lower market value
would turn the potential gain into a realized gain.
In case the bank fair values the debt security, the bank will recognize an unrealized fair value
gain when the credit standing deteriorates, that is, without having to buy back the security. This
unrealized gain increases the bank’s equity level and its Core Tier 1 ratio. However, this is where the
prudential rules come into play. Banks are subject to a prudential filter that requires them to exclude,
from the calculation of regulatory capital ratios, any unrealized gains or losses on their liabilities
valued at fair value that are due to changes in their own credit standing (e.g. see Article 64(4) of EC
(2006)).3 In addition, IFRS imposes requirements on the use of the fair value option that support the
prudential filter.
A bank can circumvent the prudential rules by repurchasing the debt security at the lower market
value. This, of course, works well if the debt security is traded below par. The realized fair value
gain is then included in the calculation of the Core Tier 1 ratio.
3The prudential filter that excludes gains and losses resulting from changes in own creditworthiness is symmetrical.
Unrealized gains originating from a deteriorated own credit standing are not included in regulatory capital. Likewise,
the loss on a debt security associated with an improved credit standing does not affect regulatory capital either. This rule
thus aligns the measurement of fair-valued liabilities with that of liabilities accounted for at amortized cost.
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Cre´dit Agricole offers an example of a typical LME. On April 1, 2009, it announced the buyback
of an Upper Tier 2 debt capital security that traded significantly below par, namely at 52%. Cre´dit
Agricole’s motivation for the LME was to increase its solvency ratio.4 Shortly after the announce-
ment, Cre´dit Agricole exchanged £545m of this security at a price of 72%, thus paying the holders
a 20% buyback premium (Cre´dit Agricole, 2011b,a). This LME would add £153m (e170m) to in-
come, and would increase equity and Core Tier 1 capital by 5.03 basis points, at a time when Cre´dit
Agricole’s Core Tier 1 capital ratio was 8%.5 Offsetting this gain is a reduction of total regulatory
capital by £545m (e605m) due to the decrease in Upper Tier 2 capital. In addition, Cre´dit Agri-
cole paid the debt security holders a cash premium of £114m (20% of £545m). If banks were free to
recognize gains on liabilities, the total unrealized fair value gain could have been recognized as net
income, which would increase common equity and Core Tier 1 capital without a decrease in total
regulatory capital and a reduction in cash.
Most of the LMEs involve hybrid debt instruments that count towards a bank’s regulatory cap-
ital.6 Buying these instruments back is subject to rules, with particularly strict rules applying to
debt capital instruments of the highest prudential quality, where the quality of capital instruments
primarily relies on their capacity to absorb losses. The buyback restrictions ensure that instruments
are available to absorb losses, for example by way of a write-down, a conversion into equity, or the
cancellation or delay of coupon payments. At the same time, the higher loss-absorbing capacity
of these instruments makes them more attractive buyback targets: it increases the likelihood of the
instrument being written off or the bank skipping a coupon payment, which means that these in-
struments trade at deeper discounts when a bank’s solvency ratio is low. As a consequence, buying
back these instruments will result in the highest realized gains. However, buying back these instru-
ments will also lead to a decrease in total regulatory capital and loss-absorbing capacity, as well as
a reduction of liquidity.
4The Cre´dit Agricole invitation to offer mentions: “The Notes currently trade at a significant discount compared
to their initial issue price. If the transaction is successful, it will result in a modest improvement in the Tier 1 solvency
ratio of [Cre´dit Agricole].”
5Note that we used the April 9, 2009 GBPEUR exchange rate of 1.1103. The e170m is pre-tax. After tax, the
amount would have contributed (even) less to Core Tier 1.
6From here on, we use the terms “security” and “instrument” interchangeably.
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The Cre´dit Agricole example shows that the prevailing market conditions in combination with
regulatory preferences that discouraged de-risking and excluded unrealized fair value gains and
losses arising from changes in own credit standing from the calculation of regulatory capital resulted
in significant unintended consequences. As the Cre´dit Agricole example shows, in exchange for a
modest increase in the Core Tier 1 capital ratio, banks sacrificed cash to make debt holders part from
their securities. The LMEs that banks executed were at the expense of their total capital ratios and
their liquidity, neither of which are in the interest of a safe and sound banking system.
Surprisingly little research has been done into the (economic) effects of the prudential filter
on unrealized gains and losses originating from changes in own credit standing. The requirement to
exclude the unrealized fair value gain on a weakened credit standing creates an incentive to arbitrage.
Option theory shows that the gain increases with leverage and at the same time, given the prudential
filter, strengthens the incentive of a bank to realize the fair value gain through the execution of an
LME. This incentive becomes even stronger when banks are pressured to increase their capital while
having limited alternative opportunities to do so.
This paper analyzes 720 LMEs of banks from 16 European countries from April 2009 to De-
cember 2013. We have access to rich and detailed LME data. The comprehensive nature of the
data allows us to examine the determinants of LMEs, as well their effects on solvency and liquidity.
Our results show that repurchasing below-par debt securities comes at a cost: to compensate the
debt holder for parting from his security, the bank pays a buyback premium. This buyback pre-
mium arises because, for a debt holder to be willing to sell his security, the buyback price should
reflect the value of the debt after the buyback (Admati, DeMarzo, Hellwig, & Pfleiderer, 2017).
Given that the buyback reduces the bank’s default probability, the value of debt increases, leading
to positive buyback premiums. The larger the buyback premium, the smaller the realized gain and
the more cash the bank needs to spend on buying back the debt security. The literature on LMEs
that are executed in the context of higher anticipated bank capital requirements is sparse. Therefore
we present extensive descriptive evidence on which banks engaged in LMEs as well as on the cost
and inefficiency of these LMEs. We then use regression analysis to examine the determinants of an
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LME. The results show that the likelihood of an LME decreases (increases) with a bank’s solvency
ratio (leverage) and decreases with bank size. We also document that banks from Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Portugal, and Spain, and listed banks were more likely to engage in an LME. The likelihood
decreases with profitability and increases with the dividend pay-out ratio. In a next step, we examine
the premium that banks paid to investors to part from their securities. Our results confirm that the
premium increases with the loss-absorbing capacity of capital instruments, economy-wide financial
stress measured by the CBOE Volatility Index, and leverage. In addition, the premium decreases
with the size of a bank. We also investigate whether banks target instruments with a high capacity to
absorb losses. We document a negative relation between bank solvency and the probability to buy
back the most loss-absorbing instruments. In addition, banks repurchase these instruments more
often in times of economic stress.
Our evidence shows that as a consequence of the interplay between prudential rules and a context
that made it difficult for banks to increase capital through established ways such as raising capital,
retaining profits or selling assets, mainly less resilient banks engaged in LMEs, during times of
economic stress. In addition, banks bought back securities that were meant to contribute the most
to the safety and soundness of the banking system as they repurchased the most loss-absorbing
capital securities. The LMEs also resulted in a loss of liquidity and a reduction in total regulatory
capital. In summary, our results show that banning banks from recognizing unrealized fair value
gains originating from a change in own credit standing has no obvious positive effects on the safety
and soundness of the banking system. To the contrary: in a context of economic uncertainty, poorly
capitalized banks, for which cash conservation is paramount, engaged in the least efficient and least
cash-conserving LMEs.
Our paper contributes to an emerging field of banking research that examines prudential filters.
Existing research on prudential filters is sparse and limited to the filter for Available-for-Sale instru-
ments (Bischof, Bru¨ggemann, & Daske, 2014; Chircop & Novotny-Farkas, 2016; Barth, Go´mez-
Biscarri, Kasznik, & Lo´pez-Espinosa, 2017; Dong & Zhang, 2017). Recent literature recognizes
prudential filters as an area of future research (Beatty & Liao, 2014; BCBS, 2015), which is surpris-
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ing given the attention prudential filters have attracted in the past. For example, the prudential filter
on fair value gains and losses due to changes in own credit standing was the subject of controversy
around the introduction of IFRS in 2005 (EC, 2005).
Whereas there is ample literature on the level of regulatory bank capital (Miller, 1995; Mehran
& Thakor, 2011; Admati, DeMarzo, Hellwig, & Pfleiderer, 2016; Beltratti & Stulz, 2012; Berger &
Bouwman, 2013; DeAngelo & Stulz, 2015; Jonghe & O¨ztekin, 2015; Firestone, Lorenc, & Ranish,
2017), papers that examine the structure of regulatory bank capital are sparse. Our results show
that banks are willing to sacrifice total regulatory capital (i.e., hybrid Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital) for
limited gains in Core Tier 1 regulatory capital.
We also contribute to the literature on fair valued liabilities: where Barth, Hodder, & Stubben
(2008) show that gains on liabilities due to a weaker credit standing are more than offset by depressed
asset values, we show that excluding these gains from bank capital does not prevent banks from
finding (costly) ways to add these gains to Core Tier 1 capital. We thus highlight an unintended
consequence of policies that aim to ban gains that some designate as counter-intuitive (ECB, 2001).
We also contribute to the understanding of the interaction between the structure and the level of
bank capital: our paper lends support to Sommer’s (2014) criticism on the narrow focus on equity
of some academics. We confirm Sommer’s view that not all liabilities are equal: Tier 1 instruments,
for example, traded significantly below par during our sample period. The associated gains reveal
that even without conversion, write-down or transaction, banks hold more equity “than we thought
they did.” (Sommer, 2014, p.28)
Our findings are relevant for policy makers and standard setters. It is illusory to ban banks
form recognizing gains or losses resulting from a change in own credit standing. Such a ban can
be arbitraged and introduces unintended consequences. Our analyses suggest that regulators should
prevent banks from buying back the most loss-absorbing instruments, consistent with the argument
made by Admati, DeMarzo, Hellwig, & Pfleiderer (2012) that if deleveraging is done inefficiently,
regulators should limit banks’ discretion.
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Literature, Regulation and Predictions
Literature
Early studies on LMEs rely on small samples, generally comprising multiple industries. For ex-
ample, Johnson, Pari, & Rosenthal (1989) examine 42 insubstance defeasance transactions over the
years 1980–1985. These transactions are similar to debt securitizations, where US accounting stan-
dards allowed firms to purchase US government securities to take risky debt off balance (FASB,
1983). The positive difference between the value of the securities and the value of debt could be
recognized as income and added to retained earnings. Johnson et al. (1989) document that debt hold-
ers benefited from these transactions, and suggest earnings management as a motive for defeasing
debt. Hand, Hughes, & Sefcik (1990) in another paper on insubstance defeasance transactions, show
that these transactions are generally bad news. However, Hand et al. (1990) remain inconclusive on
the motivation for insubstance defeasance transactions. Their sample firms defeased for various
reasons: managing earnings, attempting to avoid violating restrictions in bond covenants, or using
excess cash on hand.
More recent studies have used larger samples. For example, Mann & Powers (2007) uses a
sample of 943 tender offers from US corporates where bonds trading at a premium dominate. They
show that tender offers are more likely when credit spreads are tight. Valle´e (2016), in a study
highlighting the virtues of convertible capital instruments, documents a positive link between LMEs
and profitability measured by return on assets (ROA). Valle´e (2016) also suggests that the execution
of an LME could potentially save a bank from having to engage in forced fires sales. However, we
were not able to confirm Valle´e’s findings. For example, from our source data we learned that 82.6%
of LMEs were motivated by the desire to augment capital, not profits or the prevention of forced
fire sales. In addition, European banks struggle to make profits ever since the onset of the global
financial crisis (Lautenschla¨ger, 2016). LMEs, however, surged when banks needed more capital for
prudential reasons. We focus in our study on the causes and immediate and direct consequences of
LMEs. Post-performance of an LME measured by ROA could be the result of many factors, one of
which is declining assets.
7
Regulation
Introduction. This section describes the relevant regulation that applies to bank debt instruments and
their repurchases. It describes the accounting and solvency rules that were in effect during the period
that led up to the entry into force of the EU Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR), the European
implementation of Basel III. The description of the regulation shows that between April 2009 and
December 2013, European regulators actively managed their expectations regarding the quantity and
quality of regulatory bank capital. This led to an increased demand for Core Tier 1 capital. More
importantly, the description shows that banks relied on LMEs to satisfy the increased demand for
Core Tier 1 capital, as alternative ways to increase capital were not viable during this time period.
The accounting rules and prudential filter. The default treatment for liabilities under IFRS is to rec-
ognize them at fair value initially, and subsequently at amortized cost using the effective interest
method (IAS 39 §47 and IFRS 9 Section 4.2.1). Under IAS 39 and IFRS 9, the fair value op-
tion allows firms to designate instruments as “at fair value through profit or loss.” Banks can apply
the fair value option under certain conditions. One such condition is that banks manage their instru-
ments on a fair value basis. This implies that banks should be able to trade these instruments, which
contradicts prudential rules that require instruments to be permanently available to absorb losses.
European bank capital rules reinforce this condition by way of a prudential filter that requires the
exclusion of any unrealized gains or losses on own liabilities valued at fair value that are due to
changes in a banks’ own credit standing (CEBS, 2004; EC, 2006).
In 2006, the Basel committee adopted the IAS 39 conditions for the use of the fair value option.7
The committee also adopted the prudential filter that excludes gains and losses from changes in own
credit risk as a result of applying the fair value option to financial liabilities. The committee did so
because of the concern that, if a bank applies the option to its own debt, “it will recognise a gain
and a resulting increase in its capital when its own creditworthiness deteriorates. Such an outcome
would undermine the quality of capital measures and performance ratios” (BCBS, 2006b). The EBA
7The accounting rules in the United States (SFAS 159 and its successor Subtopic 825-10: Recognition and Mea-
surement of Financial Assets and Financial Liabilities) do not mention this condition, nor do the US implementations of
Basel II and Basel III (OCC, 2013).
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supports this cautionary stance on the recognition of unrealized gains in their advice to the European
Commission on unrealized gains (EBA, 2013a).
EU capital requirements and bank capital structure. Until the entry into force of the European imple-
mentation of Basel III in 2014, banks were subjected to the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD:
EC (2006)). This directive reflects the (first) Basel accord and the Basel II Framework, which re-
quire that 8% of risk-weighted assets is backed by capital to absorb losses [Basel I: BCBS (1988),
Basel II: BCBS (2006a)]. The CRD allowed banks to structure regulatory capital to minimize the
use of equity. Banks could satisfy the 8% total capital requirement with a maximum of 50% Tier 2
capital. Table 1 gives an overview of the regulatory capital requirements and the loss-absorbing
capacity of capital instruments.
[Table 1 about here]
To satisfy Tier 1 capital requirements under the CRD, banks could rely on hybrid capital, such as
preferred shares and perpetual or permanent instruments. Banks could thus satisfy the 8% regulatory
capital requirements with no or minimal amounts of equity capital.8 As a response to the global
financial crisis and to the G20 of April 2009, bank regulators vouched to improve the quality and
quantity of regulatory capital (G20, 2009).
The quality of capital. The publication of Basel III in December 2010 presented a new definition
of capital (BCBS, 2010). A new two-tier structure emphasized the importance of Common Equity
Tier 1 (CET1), a new item of Tier 1 capital. CET1 is capital of the highest quality: equity capital after
the deduction of specific items, such as goodwill and holdings in financial companies. Compared
to Basel II, Basel III applies an increased number of deductions to capital. In addition, Basel III
applies the deductions to equity (a subset of Tier 1 capital), whereas Basel II applied the deductions
to total regulatory capital. These regulatory developments significantly increased the demand for
equity capital.
8The formal definition of Tier 1 under CRD (EC, 2006) did not contain a common equity requirement, given that
CRD covers listed companies as well as cooperatives, mutuals, and banks that issue certificates of shares. Although
formally such institutions have no common equity in issue, the CRD included them in its scope.
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The quantity of capital. Basel III requires banks to hold at least 4.5% of CET1 over risk-weighted
assets, plus 2.5% CET1 in a capital conservation buffer. To mitigate procyclicality in the financial
sector, Basel III introduces a 2.5% countercyclical buffer. On top of these requirements is a 1%
to 5% capital surcharge for systematically important banks. The total CET1 requirement can thus
stack up to 14.5% under the EU’s implementation of Basel III, the Capital Requirements Regulation
(CRR) (EC, 2013).
It is important to realize that even though Basel III would only enter into force in 2014, banks
responded to these regulatory initiatives by issuing instruments that anticipated the upcoming re-
quirements. They did not, however, issue substantial amounts of common equity. Marinova & van
Veldhuizen (2014) show that the cumulative amount of equity issued in Europe during our sam-
ple period is less than e250m, which is significantly less than the typical nominal amount of an
instrument involved in a single LME.
Pressure to satisfy the augmented capital requirements originated from regulators. For example,
for the 2011 stress test, the EBA set a Core Tier 1 requirement of 5% of risk-weighted assets.
After this stress test, the EBA rapidly raised expectations by setting that ratio to 9% for the 2012
EBA recapitalization exercise (EBA, 2012).9 For the 2014 EU-wide stress test, the benchmark was
even set at 8% Common Equity Tier 1 using the tighter Basel III definition of capital (ECB, 2013).
Many European banks hence anticipated the entry into force of the CRR, either voluntarily or under
pressure of their supervisors. In particular the EBA recapitalization exercise in 2012 stood out,
because it required banks to meet a demanding capital requirement (Me´sonnier & Monks, 2015).
The motivation to execute LMEs. Instead of issuing new shares to satisfy the elevated Core Tier 1
ratio requirements, banks could augment their capital of the highest quality in the following three
ways: (i) retaining profits, (ii) selling assets with high risk weights in a process called “de-risking”,
and (iii) buying back debt with a low market value in an LME to realize a fair value gain.
9In setting such a high requirement, the EBA may have responded to the failed 2011 stress test, which did not
prevent some banks from failing shortly after the results were published (Pignal & Jenkins, 2011).
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The first two options were not always open to all banks. Retaining profits would entail cutting
dividend payments, which would give a bad signal to investors (Lintner, 1956; Barnato, 2016).
In addition, retaining profits is only meaningful for profitable banks, as without profits there is not
much to retain. Regarding de-risking, European supervisors actively discouraged banks from selling
assets with a high risk weight (EBA, 2011b, 2013b). Allowing banks to de-risk would lead them to
“shrink” the denominator to increase capital ratios. In practice, this would mean that banks would cut
back on lending to small and medium enterprises, as these are relatively risky borrowers, which in
Europe is a politically sensitive issue (Chassany, Crowley, & Penty, 2012). Given these limitations,
banks sought to increase capital through the execution of LMEs.
Rules and conventions on LMEs. The quality of capital instruments relies primarily on their loss-
absorbing capacity. Banks should be able to impose losses on these instruments – for example,
through a write-down or a conversion into equity. In addition, banks can impose losses on capital
instruments by canceling coupon payments on Tier 1 and Upper Tier 2 instruments.
The loss-absorbing capacity of capital instruments increases with maturity.10 However, bank
regulation governing the maturity of capital instruments is ambiguous and somewhat inconsistent.
In theory, regulatory capital instruments should be perpetual (or undated) and not callable. This
to make sure the instruments are permanently available to absorb losses. Prudential regulation also
prohibits banks from creating any expectations that the instrument will be bought back (BCBS, 2010;
EC, 2006, 2013). In practice, however, European banks in particular redeem capital instruments at
the first possible call date, which often is five years after issuance. For example, during the global
financial crisis, Deutsche Bank did not honor the call for a Tier 2 instrument, after which the bank
found it difficult and costly to access the market for new issuances of capital instruments.
Although premature redemptions violate the requirement that capital be permanently available
to absorb losses, they are perfectly legal. The CRD allows banks to call, repurchase or redeem
capital instruments after five years [Articles 63a(2) and 64(3) of CRD EC (2006)]. European banks
10An instrument with a short remaining maturity will be repaid in the foreseeable future. This prevents banks from
imposing losses on that instrument, thus limiting the loss-absorbing capacity of the instrument.
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generally do this, albeit that conditions apply, with stricter conditions applying to Tier 1 and Upper
Tier 2 instruments than to Lower Tier 2 instruments. For example, Tier 1 and Upper Tier 2 instru-
ments can generally be called if the bank replaces the instrument with an instrument of at least the
same quality or if the solvency of the credit institution in question is not (unduly) affected.11 In
practice, the last requirement sets a low bar. The redemption should not lead a bank to breach min-
imum capital requirements and most banks operated above these requirements. On the other hand,
buybacks of regulatory capital require supervisory approval, which creates some uncertainty. Not
all supervisors grant permission equally swiftly, the rules on supervisory approval are ambiguous,
although generally stricter for Tier 1 and Upper Tier 2 than for Lower Tier 2 capital.
Predictions
The buyback premium is of particular prudential interest, as it reflects a loss of cash which affects
liquidity and solvency. The premium arises because banks generally operate at high levels of lever-
age. When leverage is very high, the prospect of bankruptcy will negatively affect the value of the
bank, its debt and equity.
An important consequence of a debt buyback is that the overall value of debt of a bank increases.
Therefore, an investor who is willing to sell a debt instrument back to the bank faces a free-rider
problem: other debt holders benefit from the investor’s willingness to sell his instrument back to
the bank. Consequently, the investor will only participate in a buyback transaction if he receives
a premium. Bulow & Rogoff (1988) and Admati et al. (2017) predict that an investor will only
participate in a buyback transaction if he receives a premium that increases the price to the value
after the buyback. Appendix 1 outlines a theoretical model based on Merton (1974) that allows us
to illustrate why debt holders demand the buyback premium and why this premium varies inversely
with solvency. Consequently, we expect that less resilient banks pay higher premiums to make
investors part from their instruments.
11This last requirement is meant to respect the seniority of Tier 1 and Upper Tier 2 instruments in case a bank is poorly
capitalized. Buying these instruments back would impose losses on their holders, whereas the first and proportionately
greatest share of losses should be imposed on equity holders.
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Following the discussion on regulation in the previous section, we also expect that banks pre-
dominantly focus their LME efforts on debt instruments that count towards regulatory capital. The
accounting rules and prudential regulation jointly work in such a way that, irrespective of the way
they are accounted for, gains on these instruments can be realized only through a buyback. We also
expect banks to opportunistically exploit the unpredictability of a buyback. Regulatory capital in-
struments are meant to be permanently available to absorb losses. The prospect of having to absorb
losses therefore contributes to the depth of the discount and the related potential fair value gain in a
LME. However, the discount and the related gain would disappear if investors anticipated a buyback.
A successful LME should therefore have an element of surprise. Thanks to the rule on buybacks
that grant the initiative of a buyback to the issuer, banks were able to choose instruments with the
deepest discounts. These were generally instruments that are least likely to be bought back – for
example, instruments that are subject to more onerous buyback requirements, such as instruments
that require permission and for which permission may perhaps not be granted, or instruments that
were in issue less than five years.
We therefore expect permanent capital instruments (Tier 1 and Upper Tier 2 instruments) to show
a larger discount and potential fair value gain than Lower Tier 2 instruments or senior unsecured
debt. This is primarily because Tier 1 and Upper Tier 2 instruments are subject to requirements that
make them more loss-absorbing than other instruments (see Table 1). In addition, these instruments
are also the ones that investors may not expect to be bought back, given the more onerous buyback
requirements. Moreover, Admati et al. (2017) and Sommer (2014) offer theoretical support for the
idea that banks prefer to buy back the most junior instruments.
Sample selection and data
We gathered data from European banks over the period April 2009 to December 2013. The period
starts from the April G20 call for capital of higher quality and quantity and ends with the entry into
force of the CRR, the implementation of this G20 call. We exclude Switzerland because this country
is not bound by EU regulation. The reasons to study only EU banks are (i) EU prudential rules
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require the exclusion of unrealized fair value gains or losses from changes in own credit standing for
capital instruments, (ii) the availability of data: European banks engaged in LMEs much more often
than US banks12, and (iii) the quality of the data, as European LME transactions are all corroborated
by the Debt Capital Market desks of three investment banks.
We analyzed the summary motivations provided by the investment banks for each transaction to
infer the motives to engage in LMEs. From the 613 justifications provided, 506 (82.6%) indicate
that the LME was executed to increase Core Tier 1 capital. The remaining justifications could not
rule out that motive, but were more generic (“to manage the capital base of the bank”) or described
the process (“cash tender offer via reverse Dutch auction for up to e150m of its Upper Tier 2
subordinated callable step up notes”). We are therefore confident that increasing Core Tier 1 was
the primary motivation to engage in LMEs.13
Data levels
We use the data for analyses on different levels. At bank level we compare LME banks against
non-LME banks. This allows us to identify characteristics that may be typical for banks that execute
LMEs. At bank-year level we analyze data of banks that executed LMEs during a fiscal year. This
allows us to estimate the likelihood of an LME during a year.
To examine the consequences of buybacks and which instruments banks targeted, we focus on
the most granular level: the instrument (or contract) level. Here we analyze particulars of individual
instruments that took part in an LME, each of which is governed by a separate contract. At this level,
we focus on LMEs of capital instruments: Tier 1, Upper Tier 2, and Lower Tier 2 instruments. How-
ever, to compare these LMEs against those that involved non-capital instruments, we also include
LMEs of senior unsecured debt instruments. These instruments are closest to capital instruments in
ranking and subordination, but not subject to capital adequacy rules. Moreover, they are similar in
that they help bail out holders of financial liabilities in non-viability (Sommer, 2014).
12720 LME transactions from 69 EU banks versus 86 from 37 US banks.
13We excluded debt-equity swaps because in banking (in particular during the aftermath of the financial crisis) a
debt-equity swap in practice is a bail-in of bond-holders or creditors that occurs when a bank is in resolution or when
the bank is unable to continue as a going concern. These swaps are likely not voluntarily decided or timed by bank
managers, but by regulators, receivers, or administrators.
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The three upper panels of Table 2 present an overview of the data at the different levels. Panel A
shows that 69 of the 167 sample banks engaged in LMEs. We can compare characteristics of these
banks to the 98 sample banks that did not engage in LMEs over the sample period. Most banks that
executed LMEs bought back more than one instrument (57 out of 69 banks).
[Table 2 about here]
During the sample period (from April 1, 2009 to the end of 2013), the sample covers 787 bank-years,
of which 330 (457) are from banks that executed one or more (respectively, zero) LMEs. Panel B
shows that our sample includes 121 (666) bank-years with (without) LMEs.
Panel C reports the number of unique announcement dates as well as, at contract level, the total
number of instruments that were bought back. The sample includes data from 185 announcement
dates. Banks that executed LMEs generally visited the market more than once; they often targeted
multiple instruments in one announcement. A total of 720 instruments was bought back.14 Most
buybacks involved Tier 1 and Lower Tier 2 instruments, which partly reflects the use of these instru-
ments by banks.15
Sample coverage
We rely on both Bankscope and Datastream for consolidated bank data, as each of these databases
offer incomplete and partial coverage of EU banks. The combined data that we use from both
sources covers on average, per year, total bank assets worth e30.6tn, which is 88.3% of total EU
consolidated banking assets reported by the ECB (see Panel D of Table 2).
For items that these databases do not cover, we rely on data from the EBA stress tests, the
EBA recapitalization exercise, and ECB data of the 2014 asset quality review. Hand-collected data
14Of the 720 LMEs, 34 were bought back at a discount (negative premium) when trading at or over par at the
announcement date. Except for three LMEs, all were announced jointly with other LMEs of the same bank on the same
day. 28 of the 34 LMEs were announced after 2011 (i.e. in calmer times) and almost all of them were executed by
Spanish banks as part of EU or State imposed reorganizations (FROB). It is likely that investors were aware for some
time that these banks would execute an LME, thus driving the price at the announcement date up.
15It is nearly impossible under Basel II rules to assess details of individual capital instruments that any bank has in
issue. Data kept by data vendors on regulatory capital instruments are often incomplete as banks are not required to
disclose this information.
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complements missing EBA and ECB data for the year 2009. Restricting hand collection of prudential
data items to only EBA-covered banks should not lead to a loss of generalizability, given that EBA
bank data cover more than 70% of the EU bank assets.16
Panel E of Table 2 shows that participation in LMEs differs across countries. For Denmark,
for example, the sample has observations from 25 banks, of which one engaged in an LME, in
2011. Spain, on the other hand, reports 10 LMEs in 2012, whereas the number of sample banks
is comparable to that of Denmark. The sample also reflects differences in market structures across
Europe – with Denmark, France, Italy, Germany and Spain having many banks, and many other
countries having fewer. Luxembourg has a low number of observations, likely because the banks
operating in that country are predominantly subsidiaries of banks from other countries. Finland and
Norway have no LME data.
Announcement data
Banks announce an LME generally via a press release. We use the announcement to retrieve the
pre-announcement price. After completion of the LME, a bank publishes details for each instrument
involved: the exchange price, notional offered amount, and notional accepted amount. We use this
information and the information from the announcement to calculate for each instrument included
in the LME the buyback premium as well as the realized fair value gain which increases the Core
Tier 1 capital ratio. This realized gain is the difference between the nominal value of the underlying
exchanged instrument and the associated paid amount, summed over the instruments involved in an
LME.
We measure the cost of the LME by calculating the difference between the potential fair value
gain that a bank could realize, based on the pre-announcement price of the nominal underlying
exchanged instruments and the actual gain that the bank realized. This cost is equal to the buyback
premium multiplied with the nominal value exchanged. The larger the buyback premium, the more
the holder of the instrument gains and the less a bank can increase its Core Tier 1 capital ratio.
16The total assets covered by ECB’s asset quality review (AQR) is over 82%, but it should be noted that the wider
scope of the AQR is mainly the result of the inclusion of subsidiaries of banks covered by the EBA. To prevent double
counting of subsidiary-owned assets and liabilities, we rely on EBA’s consolidated scope.
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Research design and results
Characteristics of LMEs
Table 3 presents descriptive evidence on the characteristics of banks that engaged in LMEs versus
those that did not during the sample period.
[Table 3 about here]
Panel A shows that banks that engaged in LMEs score poorly on many dimensions: profitability,
solvency, regulatory capital ratios, liquidity (cash), and asset quality are much lower compared to
non-LME banks. Untabulated results show that the relative shortfall of cash does not change for
bank-years with LMEs. Density, measured by the ratio of risk-weighted assets over total assets and
beta are also high for banks executing an LME – that is, LME banks appear to display a relatively
high risk appetite, which the low market to book ratios confirm. The banks that did not engage
in LMEs are relatively small compared to LME banks: the average total assets of LME banks is
e326bn versus e107bn for non-LME banks.
An explanation for why larger banks executed LMEs is that they generally involve complex
hybrid instruments which are subject to extensive regulation. There are economies of scale – for
example, the nominal value of a typical capital instrument is e375m or more. Consequently, larger
banks likely have more instruments in issue at the start of the sample period.17 More importantly,
the capacity needed to manage these instruments implies that larger banks are more successful in ob-
taining the required supervisory approval to execute an LME. This is in line with Ioannidou (2005),
who shows that larger banks are less likely the subject of formal supervisory intervention.
Panel B of Table 3 reports dividend pay-out statistics of 121 bank-year observations with and
666 bank-year observations without LMEs. Banks that engaged in LMEs have higher pay-out ratios
than non-LME banks in the year before the LME (44.9% versus 25.9%) and in the year of the
LME (39.4% versus 23.5%). There is a drop in pay-out ratio after an LME, from 44.9% to 39.4%,
17See footnote 15.
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however this drop is insignificant (untabulated p-value of 0.37). This suggests that banks generally
avoid cutting dividends and revert to other (less efficient) ways of increasing capital.
The buyback premium
Table 4 reports descriptive statistics of the buyback premium, as well as the associated costs, gains
and inefficiencies of LMEs. Panel A shows the distribution of the buyback premium for banks that
engaged in an LME. The mean premium is relatively high when compared to other research. De
Jong, Roosenboom, & Schramade (2009), for a wide sample of EU banks before the global financial
crisis, for example, report an average (median) premium of 3.9% (1.2%) whereas we find an average
(median) premium of 8.22% (5.06%). Mann & Powers (2007) report average (median) premiums of
5.55% (3.24%). A possible explanation for these differences is that our sample contains only banks,
which are highly levered and for which buybacks are subject to supervisory permission. In addition,
our sample period is situated after the onset of the financial crisis, which may have deepened the
discounts.
[Table 4 about here]
The discount at which the instruments taking part in a LME trade is substantial, on average about
a quarter of the nominal value with an inter-quartile range of two thirds of that value. The average
potential fair value gain that a bank could realize in an LME is 20.0 bp of total assets (29.2 bp of
risk-weighted assets). The average actual, or realized, gain however, is substantially lower: 14.3 bp
of total assets (21.8 bp of risk-weighted assets). These gains may appear limited, however, when
expressed in relation to equity, they are substantial: the mean (median) realized gain is 390 bp
(97.4 bp).
The difference between potential and actual gains on LMEs reveals their cost. Although these
costs are limited in comparison to total assets (5.66 bp on average), their effect on equity can be
substantial: the mean (median) cost of a LME on equity holders is 115 bp (48.9 bp). However, their
effect at the 99th percentile can be significantly larger: 1,355 bp.
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Panel B shows the buyback premium as a percentage of the par value of the exchanged instrument
by regulatory classification. It shows that holders of permanent instruments, namely Tier 1 and
Upper Tier 2 instruments, command a higher buyback premium (11.32% and 9.87%) than holders
of Lower Tier 2 instruments (5.59%) and non-regulatory instruments (2.48%). The differences in
the premiums between regulatory classifications are also significantly different from zero, except for
the difference in the premiums paid for Tier 1 and Upper Tier 2 instruments (p-value = 0.19). The
next column in Panel B shows the amounts offered per instrument, which are comparable for capital
instruments, but about twice as large for unsecured debt instruments.
Panel B also shows the inefficiency of LMEs. For example, the average Upper Tier 2 instrument
would, in the absence of an LME, offer a 41.8% unrealized gain. However, this is deceptive: the
average realized gain is only 31.9% (41.8%−9.87%) as part of the potential gain (the premium) is
transfered to the holders of the bought-back instruments. The rightmost column of Panel B measures
this inefficiency. It measures which part of the potential buyback premium accrues to debt holders.
This column shows that LMEs that involve the most loss-absorbing instruments are the least cash
conserving: about a quarter of the potential gain goes to the debt holders. The transfer is lower for
less loss-absorbing instruments.
The lower part of Panel B shows the mean amount exchanged per instrument as well as the
loss of regulatory capital per exchanged instrument (in italics). The amounts are smaller for capital
instruments than for unsecured debt. Note that not all instruments offered are exchanged: the success
rate of an LME is about 53%.
Table 5 shows a breakdown of the premiums as well as the amounts involved per year and per
country. The premiums vary by year, with 2009 (2010) reporting the highest (lowest) premiums.
The observations of 2009 may reflect lingering uncertainty during the post-Lehman collapse period
as untabulated results show a drop in premiums, from 11.9% for the first half of 2009 to 8.36% for
the second half of 2009. The low premiums in 2010 coincide with a low number of exercises. The
potential gain of the LMEs reaches a total of e41.6bn.
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[Table 5 about here]
Panel A of Table 5 also shows that the actual, or realized, gains on LMEs are significantly lower
than the potential gains. The difference is e9.1bn, which is about 22% of the potential gain. To put
the amount of e9.1bn in perspective, it is 35% of the reported total capital shortfall of e25bn that
the ECB reported for the 2014 EU asset quality review (ECB, 2014).
In addition, Panel A shows that in 2011 and 2012, the years of the controversial EBA stress test
and the EBA recapitalization exercise, banks executed more LMEs than in other years. In these two
years, banks offered a total nominal amount of e162.2bn, about 64% of the sample total. In the
other years, banks offered significantly less. The number of banks engaging in LMEs is also high
for these two years: 36 (2011) and 51 (2012), where in other years this number ranges from 13 to 25.
The effect of the LMEs on total EU regulatory capital is a reduction of e110.9bn, with the largest
reductions taking place in 2011 and 2012.
Lastly, the penultimate row of Panel A shows that the number of LMEs dropped in 2013. The
mean premium value for this year is high due to the premium paid by the Eurobank of Greece.
Excluding this bank would lead the mean premium value to drop to 3%, which helps explain the
decrease in activity for 2013: the gains to be made in an LME dropped.
Panel B of Table 5 shows the transactions per country. France, Ireland, Italy, Spain and the UK
were particularly active regarding LMEs. The countries with the lowest efficiency were Portugal
and Spain, with Spanish banks transferring 48.2% of the potential gains to debt instrument holders.
Cyprus and Ireland show a low discrepancy between potential and actual gains, as banks in these
countries were obliged to impose losses on debt holders.
In the previous two sections, we presented descriptive evidence on the characteristics of banks
that engaged in LMEs versus those that did not and on the inefficiency of LMEs. In the next section
we investigate more formally the determinants of an LME using a multivariate regression model.
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The likelihood of an LME
At bank level, we model the likelihood of an LME using the following probit model, henceforward
referred to as the LME model:
LME[0,1] =β0+β1Solvency+β2Size+β3Pay-out+β4ROA+
β5GIIPS+β6Listed+ 8∑
n=7βnBusiness model+ε (1)
where LME is equal to one if a bank engages in an LME in a fiscal year, and zero otherwise.
Solvency is either Tier 1 capital divided by risk-weighted assets (SolvTier 1) or accounting equity
divided by total assets (SolvEquity). Size is the natural log of total assets in millions of euros. Pay-out
is dividend as a proportion of net income. ROA is net income over total assets. GIIPS is an indicator
for LMEs from Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. Listed indicates whether the bank is
listed on a stock exchange. Business model is indicator variable for the following bank types: “retail-
funded” or “trading” based on the average values for gross loans and interbank borrowing. Except
for GIIPS, the regressors are lagged variables to respect the order of causality. The regression model
relies on p-values that account for two-dimensional within-cluster correlation (Petersen, 2009).
We expect the coefficient on Solvency to be negative and the coefficient on Size to be positive. We
control for dividend Pay-out as it may be associated with the probability of an LME for two reasons.
First, dividends are sticky over time (Lintner, 1956). Therefore banks may choose to continue
paying dividends, even if this is at the expense of retained earnings and additions to Core Tier 1
capital. Ceteris paribus, a dividend-paying bank will need to replenish equity capital sooner than a
bank that does not pay dividends. Second, by paying debt holders a premium, banks that engage in
LMEs give their non-equity capital instrument holders a preferential treatment over equity holders.
To prevent unequal treatment of investors, debt contracts often contain clauses that are referred to as
“pushers” and “stoppers.” These clauses align the payment of dividends and coupons. The buyback
of a debt instrument may therefore prompt a bank to continue paying dividends.
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We control for profitability (ROA), of which the coefficient should be negative, as low profitabil-
ity limits a bank that wishes to increase retained earnings and capital. We use an indicator variable
to control for Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain (GIIPS). These countries were singled out
as risky debtor countries during our sample period and are therefore potentially less able to guar-
antee their national banks. This implies an expected positive coefficient on this indicator variable.
We apply an additional control for listing status, as listed banks may operate in a different disclo-
sure environment and may be subjected to different regulations – for example, MiFID (Directive
2004/39/EC) and exchange listing rules. Lastly, we control for a possible business model effect, as
banks may issue debt instruments to distinct investor classes. For this control, we rely on Roeng-
pitya, Tarashev, & Tsatsaronis (2014), who classify European banks into distinct business models.
We use separate indicators for retail-funded and trading banks.
Table 6 shows the correlation matrix for the main regression variables. This table shows that the
occurrence of an LME in a year negatively correlates with solvency and profitability, and positively
with the other variables. The correlations are broadly consistent with our expectations.
[Table 6 about here]
Table 7 presents the results of the LME model. The dependent variable of the probit model is one
if a bank engages in an LME during a fiscal year, and zero otherwise. The coefficients on Solvency
are negative and significant, as expected: −5.55 for accounting solvency and −6.88 for regulatory
solvency, both with p-values of 0.00. The likelihood of an LME thus increases as banks’ solvency
decreases. The coefficient on Size is positive and significant. The coefficient on Pay-out is positive,
and the coefficient on ROA negative. These two coefficient values are as expected, albeit that the
latter is not significant. Next, we find that banks in Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain are
more likely to execute an LME, as well as listed banks and banks that adopted a trading or a retail-
funded business model.
[Table 7 about here]
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Overall, the results of Table 7 show that the likelihood of an LME increases with leverage and size.
The LME model thus shows that poorly capitalized banks engaged in LMEs, which is consistent
with the idea that the unrealized gain on a debt instrument incentivizes banks to buy them back,
but is inconsistent with prudential rules that prevent poorly capitalized banks from buying back
capital instruments. The positive coefficients on size are in line with Ioannidou (2005) and likely
reflect bargaining power or economies of scale, as larger banks are in a better position to manage the
instruments that they choose to issue and later buy back: e.g. larger banks may obtain permission
quicker than smaller banks. Other factors that increase the likelihood of an LME are location in one
of the GIIPS countries, which likely reflects a higher perceived risk of bank failure.18
Determinants of the buyback premium
The main variable of interest in the second stage of the analysis is the buyback premium. This
is the difference between the buyback price and the value of the instrument before the buyback
announcement:
pi = PX −PA, (2)
where PX is the exchange price of the instrument expressed as a percentage of the nominal value
of the instrument and PA is the pre-announcement price of the instrument, also expressed as a per-
centage of the nominal value of the instrument (PN). Instruments that are bought back in an LME
generally trade below par at the announcement date (PA < PN). The exchange price should therefore
be higher than the price at the announcement and lower than the nominal value: PA < PX < PN . The
reason we focus on the buyback premium is because it is the part of the regulated gain that the bank
loses in an LME.
18We ran this regression including a book-to-market variable of which the coefficient is positive but weakly signifi-
cant only. This finding does not change our inferences. Moreover, it confirms Bhagat, Bolton, & Lu (2015), who show
that leverage primarily drives risk.
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The Premium model below allows us to examine the factors that affect the buyback premium for
individual bought-back instruments:
pi =β0+β1Tier 1+β2Upper Tier 2+β3Lower Tier 2+β4V IX +β5Solvency+
β6Size+β7EBA Recap+β8Mills′+ε (3)
where pi is the buyback premium for each individual bought-back instrument, expressed as a per-
centage of the nominal underlying value of the instrument, or the inverse hyperbolic sine of the
premium: sinh−1pi. The latter is a log transformation of the premium that is not restricted to only
positive values.
Tier 1 is an indicator variable that is set to one if the bought-back instrument counted towards
Tier 1 capital, and zero otherwise. Likewise, Upper (Lower) Tier 2 is an indicator variable for
an Upper (Lower) Tier 2 instrument, where Table 1 shows the loss-absorbing capacity of these
instruments. As the sample used for the regressions contains transactions where the exchanged
instrument is a regulatory capital instrument or an unsecured debt instrument, the coefficient values
for Tier 1, Upper Tier 2 and Lower Tier 2 are relative to those of unsecured debt instruments. As
explained, we expect the coefficients on Tier 1 and Upper Tier 2 instruments to be positive and
higher than the coefficient on Lower Tier 2 instruments because Tier 1 and Upper Tier 2 instruments
are meant to be more loss-absorbent, and their buybacks are subjected to stricter rules. Solvency is
either accounting equity divided by total assets (SolvEquity) or Core Tier 1 capital divided by risk-
weighted assets (SolvCoreTier 1), where Core Tier 1 capital is Tier 1 capital net of hybrid Tier 1 capital
instruments. We expect the coefficient for Solvency to be negative.
Given that this analysis uses intra-year data, we now include the CBOE Volatility Index (VIX)
and EBA recapitalization exercise in this model. VIX is the closing value of the CBOE Volatility
Index, standardized to values between zero and one. We expect the CBOE Volatility Index to be
positively associated with the buyback premium, given that worse financial conditions are associ-
ated with higher correlations, higher volatilities, and higher spreads (Schwert, 2011; Opschoor, van
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Dijk, & van der Wel, 2014). EBA Recap is an indicator variable that is equal to one for repurchases
that took place from September to December 7, 2011, the time before the EBA announced the re-
capitalization exercise results (EBA, 2011a). The response to the EBA recapitalization exercise,
which required banks to meet a fairly demanding capital requirement of 9% Core Tier 1, may have
prompted banks without excess capital to announce an LME, which would imply a positive coef-
ficient on this indicator variable. On the other hand, buybacks in these months may have alerted
investors, who then may have responded by buying hybrid capital instruments in anticipation of an
LME, which would imply a negative coefficient on the indicator. As a result, we have no expecta-
tions on this indicator variable. Next, we control for the size of banks, where we expect to find a
negative coefficient. We include the inverse Mills ratio, obtained from the results of the LME model,
to control for selection bias.
Table 8 presents the correlations between the variables included in the buyback premium model.
The table shows that the buyback premium correlates positively with the most loss-absorbing instru-
ments (Tier 1 and Upper Tier 2), the CBOE Volatility Index, and the EBA recapitalization exercise,
albeit that the latter correlation is weak. The other correlation coefficients are negative, in particular
the coefficients on solvency and size. Table 8 thus shows that most correlation coefficients are as
expected.
[Table 8 about here]
The high and negative correlation coefficient between Tier 1 and Upper Tier 2 appears to indicate
that these two instruments are substitutes and more similar to each other than to Lower Tier 2 instru-
ments. The other high correlation coefficient is the one between the CBOE Volatility Index and the
EBA recapitalization exercise.19
Table 9 shows the results of the buyback premium model. The first column presents the base-line
regression results only, with minimal overlap of variables included in the LME model. Subsequent
19Note that, although Table 8 shows a high correlation between CBOE Volatility Index and the EBA recapitalization
exercise, the variance inflation factors for these two variables are low (2.01 and 1.98) and for all variables they are well
below 10. Therefore, multicollinearity is unlikely to affect the coefficient estimates.
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columns include also size and solvency. The coefficients on the capital instruments are all positive
and significant, which confirms that investors command a premium for redeeming capital instru-
ments. The coefficients are significant for all three types of instruments: for Tier 1 hybrids the
coefficient value is 1.46, for Upper Tier 2 instruments it is 1.13, and for Lower Tier 2 instruments
it is 0.88, all with p-values of 0.00. As expected, the coefficient on VIX is positive and significant
(2.47, p-value of 0.00). The coefficients on the two solvency variables are negative and significant:−10.1 (p = 0.00) for the coefficient on accounting solvency and −11.2 (p = 0.00) for Core Tier 1
ratio. These results confirm our expectation that less resilient banks pay higher premiums to make
investors part from their instruments. The coefficient on size is also consistently negative: larger
banks pay a lower premium, a result that can be attributed to either a better information environment
or lower risk. Lastly, the coefficient on the EBA recapitalization exercise is negative throughout,
though not always significant. This coefficient value is consistent with the interpretation that the
EBA recapitalization exercise may have contributed to the information environment, and not consis-
tent with the notion that the exercise forced banks to reveal more about their true solvency position
than the two other measures of solvency did.
[Table 9 about here]
Moving to the last four columns, these present the coefficients of a linear regression model with
the buyback premium (pi) as dependent variable. These coefficients facilitate an assessment of the
economic significance of the results. For example, the coefficient values on Tier 1 show that these
instruments require a 6–10% higher premium than senior unsecured instruments. The coefficient
values on solvency indicate that a drop of the solvency ratio by 1% point increases the buyback
premium by 34 to 63%, which is economically significant. The coefficient on VIX has the potential
to increase the premium by at least 10%, which too is economically significant. Although the co-
efficient values on Upper Tier 2 instruments are higher than the coefficients on Tier 1 instruments,
the probabilities shown in the row below the intercept values indicate that we cannot reject the
hypothesis that these coefficients are equal.
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The results reported in Table 9 confirm our expectations that the buyback premiums paid in
LMEs (i) increase with the loss-absorbing capacity of bought back instruments, (ii) increase with
economy-wide financial stress measured by the VIX, (iii) decrease with solvency, and (iv) decrease
with bank size. The results are relevant – for example, the results on loss-absorbing capacity and
solvency reveal unintended consequences of the requirement to exclude unrealized fair value gains
on debt instruments that are due to a change in credit standing from regulatory capital. The results
on VIX show that supervisors’ decisions to require banks to recapitalize in times of economic stress
may have unintended consequences. On the other hand, the results on the EBA recapitalization
exercise show that a coordinated recapitalization exercise may mitigate the adverse effects of LMEs.
Determinants of instruments that banks target
The models above do not distinguish between the types of instruments that banks bought back. To
investigate whether banks use their discretion to target specific instruments, we run an ordered probit
model at instrument level:
T[1..4] =β0+β1Solvency+β2Discount+β3VIX+β4Size+β5Pay-out+β6ROA+β7GIIPS+
β8EBA Recap+β9Listed+ 11∑
n=10βnBusiness model+β12Mills′+ε (4)
where the dependent variable (T ) is a categorical variable that increases with the loss-absorbing
quality of the instrument. Its value is “4” for an LME involving a Tier 1 instrument, “3” for an
Upper Tier 2 instrument, “2” for a Lower Tier 2 instrument, and “1” for senior unsecured debt.
Discount is 1 minus the pre-announcement price expressed as a fraction of the face value of the
bought-back instrument: 1−PA. We include this variable as it is likely positively related to the
loss-absorbing quality of the bought-back instrument. All other variables are as defined previously.
[Table 10 about here]
Consistent with our expectations, the correlations shown in the lower rows of Table 8, and with
Admati et al. (2017), we find that lower solvency increases the likelihood of the repurchase of
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a more loss-absorbing instrument. The discount variable also confirms expectations, with deeper
discounts for more loss-absorbing instruments. Likewise, the coefficient on VIX shows that banks
target more loss-absorbing instruments in times of higher economic uncertainty. The positive size
coefficient likely indicates that larger banks may have more Tier 1 and Upper Tier 2 instruments in
issue. The positive coefficient on ROA is probably a reflection of the supervisory approval process.
Holding other factors constant, supervisors may grant permission earlier when profitability of a bank
looks good.
Additional tests
Alternative motivations for LMEs. Our paper relies on the motivations for LMEs mentioned in the
offer documentation. Increasing regulatory capital is the first and foremost reason for engaging in
an LME: 82.6% of the transactions were the result of a bank wanting to augment regulatory capital.
Nevertheless, we investigated the following alternative motivations: i) earnings management, ii)
tax, and iii) capital structure.
As for the earnings management motive, we examined whether a bank executing an LME would
report a positive net income just because of the execution of the LME. We find only six bank-year
observations, out of 330, where an LME helped a bank turn a negative net income number into a
positive one. Using OLS we estimated a measure of abnormal loan loss provisioning to examine if
banks with abnormal loan losses (an indication of earnings management) are more likely to engage
in LMEs. We included the residual of our loan loss estimation model as a variable in our analyses.
However, our measure of abnormal loan loss provisions is not significant in our regressions. This
supports our finding that liability management is the prime driver for conducting LMEs, not earnings
management.
Regarding the tax motive, it should be noted that tax deductibility is the primary reason for banks
to issue non-equity capital instruments. A buyback would therefore be at the expense of tax savings.
Still, a bank that accumulates losses may suffer less from the tax disadvantages of a buyback. We
therefore examined whether banks with relatively high amounts of deferred tax assets (DTAs) are
associated with the occurrence of an LME. Including a DTA variable in the regressions reported
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in Tables 7 and 10 does not result in significant coefficients. From this we infer that tax reasons
do not drive the decision to execute an LME or to target a specific instrument. On the other hand,
including DTAs in the analyses of Table 9 gives positive coefficients that are significant for three
out of the four full model specifications (i.e., the specifications including a solvency measure). The
other coefficients remain unaffected. We infer from this that fixed income investors see the presence
of DTAs as a factor that contributes to the vulnerability of banks, and thus allows them to require
a higher compensation to part from their instruments. This pricing effect thus works against a tax
motive: where accumulated losses potentially favor a buyback, it instead lowers the realized gain
and it leads to an outflow of liquidity to compensate fixed income investors.
Regarding the capital structure motive, we find that 31% of the LMEs are exchanges, where
a bank replaces an existing instrument by a new instrument at new terms. If purely deleveraging
would motivate banks to engage in LMEs, we would observe differences between cash LMEs and
exchanges. We therefore included in our analyses an indicator variable that is equal to one if the
LME is a cash transaction, and zero otherwise. As this is a variable measured at LME contract level,
we include it in the regressions reported in Tables 9 and 10. Our results show no show significant
coefficients on this indicator variable.
We also examined annual changes of total assets and densities for bank-years with and without
LMEs. We found no results that confirm significant differences between LME and non-LME bank-
years for these variables.
We do find positive changes in the annual (Core) Tier 1 ratios for bank-years with LMEs (p-
values of 0.084 for ∆Tier 1 and 0.0124 for ∆Core Tier 1, using multivariate analyses controlling
for size, profitability, pay-out, solvency, business model, and GIIPS). These results lend additional
support to our argumentation that augmenting capital is the main motive for banks to execute an
LME, not altering a bank’s capital structure.
LMEs that involve senior unsecured instruments. To assess differences between LMEs that involve
capital instruments versus LMEs that do not involve such instruments, we separate out bank-years
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that involve transactions in only senior unsecured instruments. Unfortunately, there are only nine
such bank-years, which is insufficient to influence the results. From this we infer that banks in-
clude senior unsecured instruments in their offerings jointly with capital instruments, which makes
it difficult to analyze them separately.
We also examine the proportion of cash LMEs versus LMEs that exchanged instruments for each
of the four instrument types (Tier 1, Upper and Lower Tier 2 and Senior Unsecured). About 69%
of the LMEs are cash LMEs, where that percentage is 76.5% for Tier 1 LMEs and 76.9% for senior
unsecured LMEs.20 From this we infer that banks include senior unsecured instruments in LMEs
for the same reason as Tier 1 instruments.
LME success rate and IFRS Not all invitations to offer an instrument are successful – the success
rate is 53%. We examine the effects of the success rate, but our inferences are unaffected. IFRS
does not affect our results: from 2007 on, the EU implementation of IFRS requires firms whose debt
securities are admitted on a regulated market of any Member State to apply IFRS EC (2002).
Conclusion
European bank regulation requires banks to exclude, for the calculation of regulatory capital ratios,
any unrealized gains or losses on their liabilities valued at fair value that are due to changes in their
own credit standing. This is to safeguard the safety and soundness of the banking system. In the lead-
up to the implementation of Basel III and as a response to the higher anticipated capital requirements,
European banks repurchased instruments which traded at a discount from their holders in Liability
Management Exercises (LMEs) to turn the unrealized gain into a realized one. The majority of
LMEs involved hybrid debt instruments that counted as regulatory bank capital. These instruments
were bought back, after which the gain, net of the buyback premium, contributed to the formation
of additional Core Tier 1 capital.
Using highly detailed data, we investigate the determinants of 720 European LMEs from April
2009 to December 2013 as well as the effect on banks’ solvency and liquidity. We also examine
20For Upper (Lower) Tier 2, these percentages are lower (68.4% and 60.4% respectively).
30
the determinants of the buyback premium, a measure of the inefficiency of the LME, and the types
of instruments that were bought back. Our results show that the likelihood of an LME decreases
with a bank’s solvency. We also find that the buyback premium increases with (i) the loss-absorbing
capacity of capital instruments, (ii) economy-wide financial stress, and (iii) leverage. The buyback
premiums are at the expense of banks’ liquidity and overall regulatory capital.
Altogether, these results indicate that the prevailing market conditions in combination with reg-
ulatory preferences that discouraged de-risking and excluded unrealized fair value gains and losses
arising from changes in own credit standing from the calculation of regulatory capital resulted in
significant unintended consequences. Namely, our results show that the most loss-absorbing instru-
ments are the most attractive buyback targets. In addition, regulation allows buybacks of the most
loss-absorbing instruments only if a bank is sufficiently solvent. However, our results provide ev-
idence that the least solvent banks engaged in LMEs. Our results also show that the incentive to
engage in an LME increases in times of economic stress. Our findings have several policy implica-
tions: contrary to the objectives of bank solvency rules, the prudential filter on unrealized fair value
gains on debt instruments may not help the safety and soundness of the banking system. In a con-
text of economic uncertainty, poorly capitalized banks, for which cash conservation is paramount,
engaged in the least efficient and least cash conserving LMEs. This is precisely opposite to what the
prudential filter aims to achieve.
It should be stressed that besides preserving and increasing regulatory capital, cash conservation
is an important objective of bank supervisors. The Basel committee introduced many rules that
preserve capital as well as liquidity. An example is the capital conservation buffer that forces banks
to stop paying dividends when capital dips below a pre-specified ratio. Even today, supervisors
remain firm on the preservation of both capital and liquidity. The EBA recently reaffirmed its stance
on limiting distributions to investors (EBA, 2017). Lastly, at least one EU supervisor (DNB, the
Netherlands) requires banks to apply for regulatory permission for dividend payments.
Returning to the question in the title of this paper, the answer is affirmative: below-par own debt
repurchases should be a cause for prudential concern. In general, banks do not recognize unrealized
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gains, because they are uncertain. However, once banks lose their resilience and in times of eco-
nomic uncertainty the prudential rules that are the subject of our study become ineffective: banks
will circumvent the rules that ban the recognition of unrealized gains originating from a weakened
own credit standing. They then execute LMEs. In particular the least resilient banks will engage in
LMEs when they are most vulnerable. Our analyses suggest that regulators should prevent banks
from buying back the most loss-absorbing instruments, consistent with the argument made by Ad-
mati et al. (2012) that if deleveraging is done inefficiently, regulators should limit banks’ discretion.
Our study is subject to a number of limitations. First, we focus on a specific industry and a
specific time period, during which the incentives to engage in LMEs are very clear ex ante. The
execution of the LMEs that we examine is a function of motive, opportunity, and ability. During
our sample period, banks clearly had both a motive (i.e., increasing regulatory capital) and the op-
portunity (i.e., many capital instruments traded below par). The advantage is that in this almost
experimental setting we can develop clear tests without a strong need to control for other confound-
ing factors. The drawback is that our study does not give insights into why banks in general would
repurchase their debt. Nevertheless, our results are generalizable outside our sample period: on 12
February 2016, Deutsche Bank, after a set-back of regulatory capital, engaged in just what our paper
describes: it announced a buyback of debt worth $5.37bn, with predictable effects on capital and
liquidity. On liquidity, the completion note reveals that Deutsche Bank had increased its purchase
price “by 1.50-2.60 percentage points or respectively lower the spreads by 20-25 bps at which it ac-
cepts bonds within this tender offer,” to “. . . provide liquidity to holders of the debt securities listed
in the tender offer.” A second limitation pertains to the ability of banks to buy back instruments. As
explained in footnote 15, it is impossible to assess details of all capital instruments that any bank
had in issue. As a result we rely on size as a measure of ability, as larger banks likely have more
instruments in issue.
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Table 1. Regulatory capital and loss-absorbing capacity.
Basel II and CRD Item Maturity Remarks Requirement
Capital of highest quality (book eq-
uity after deductions)
Core Tier 1 Cannot be repaid
outside liquidation
⇒
Less
loss
absorbing
Tier 1 + Tier 2 ≥8%
of RWA
> 12 of Tier 13 ⇐
S
ubordination
Hybrid instruments1,2 Tier 1 hybrids Permanent, perpet-
ual
Coupon and instru-
ment should absorb
losses in going con-
cern
≤ 12 of Tier 13
Subordinated debt instruments1,2 Upper Tier 2 Permanent, no matu-
rity
Coupon and instru-
ment should absorb
losses in going con-
cern
Tier 2 ≤ Tier 1
Subordinated debt instruments1 Lower Tier 2 Maturity ≥ 5 years
and a 5-year gradual
capital derecognition
period
≤ 12 of Tier 1
Senior unsecured debt Buyback without per-
mission
Basel III and CRR Item Maturity Remarks Requirement
Capital of highest quality Common equity
Tier 1 (CET1)
Cannot be repaid
outside liquidation
⇒
Less
loss
absorbing
≥ 4.5% + buffers up
to 10% of RWA
⇐
S
ubordination
Hybrid instruments1,4 Additional Tier 1
(AT1)
Permanent, perpet-
ual, preferential
Subordinated to
Tier 2; coupon may
be cancelled
≥ 1.5% of RWA
Subordinated debt instruments1,4 Tier 2 Maturity ≥ 5 years
and then a 5-year lin-
ear capital derecog-
nition period
≥ 2% of RWA
Senior unsecured debt Buyback without per-
mission
Note: The table outlines the loss-absorbing capacity of capital instruments, with the most loss-absorbing items at the top. The descriptions follow capital
definitions of Basel II (BCBS, 2006a), the Basel press release on instruments eligible for inclusion in Tier 1 capital (BCBS, 1998), CRD (EC, 2006),
Basel III (BCBS, 2010, 2011), and CRR (EC, 2013). CRR (Europe’s Basel III implementation) entered into force on January 1, 2014. Tier 1 hybrid and
Additional Tier 1 instruments are senior in ranking to common stock and rank junior to depositors, general creditors and subordinated debt of the bank.
Upper Tier 2 instruments are undated, permanent instruments that are subordinated in full to non-subordinated creditors. Lower Tier 2 instruments are
dated instruments of which the principal is subordinated to non-subordinated creditors. Tier 2 (Basel III) instruments are subordinated to depositors
and general creditors of the bank. RWA is risk-weighted assets.
1 These instruments are callable at the initiative of the issuer after a minimum of five years. Buybacks generally need supervisory approval, but CRD
rules for Lower Tier 2 instruments are ambiguous (EC, 2006).
2 Calls are generally allowed if the bank replaces the instrument with an instrument of at least the same quality, or if the financial and solvency
conditions of the institution are not (unduly) affected (EC, 2006).
3 Before CRD changed in 2011, the directive had no requirement regarding the amount of common equity, nor had it a definition of common equity.
4 Under Basel III rules and under the EU bank recovery and resolution directive, all instruments shall be written off or converted into equity at the
point that the viability of the bank is at risk (BCBS, 2011; EC, 2014). The CRR allows calling the instrument before maturity after prior supervisory
approval and if the bank replaces the called instrument by an instrument of equal or higher quality at terms that are sustainable for the income capacity
of the institution; or the bank demonstrates that its capital position is well above the minimum capital requirements after the call option is exercised.
37
Table 2. Sample coverage.
Panel A: Bank level Banks
Total 167
Banks executing an LME during 2009–2013 69
Of which, banks with
a single LME (12)
more than one LME (57)
Banks that did not execute an LME over the sample period 98
Panel B: Bank-year level Bank-years
All bank-years 787
Of which, bank-years with LMEs 121
no LME 666
Panel C: Instrument level Announcement Instruments,
dates Contracts
Total 185 720
Of which Tier 1 97 280
Upper Tier 2 50 97
Lower Tier 2 92 302
Unsecured debt 11 41
Panel D: Total bank assets (e tn) Average 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009
Sample 30.6 29.4 32.6 33.0 31.4 26.5
ECB 34.7 32.4 35.5 35.9 34.6 34.8
Coverage (%) 88.3 90.7 91.9 91.8 90.7 76.2
Panel E: Bank-years with, without LMEs 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009
Austria 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
Belgium 4 2 4 4 4 1 4
Cyprus 3 1 3 3 3 3
Denmark 24 25 1 25 25 25
Finland 1 1 1 1 1
France 21 5 21 3 21 21 2 21
Germany 14 14 1 15 15 15
Greece 4 7 4 8 8 9 1 9
Ireland 2 3 3 3 2 4 3 4
Italy 3 19 7 20 4 19 1 19 2 19
Luxembourg 1 2 2 2 1 1
Netherlands 1 7 1 7 4 7 1 7 2 7
Norway 1 1 1 1 1
Portugal 5 1 5 4 5 5 4
Slovenia 2 2 4 4 4 4
Spain 1 19 10 19 6 26 4 25 5 20
Sweden 4 4 4 4 1 4
United Kingdom 4 13 7 13 5 13 4 13 4 11
Total 15 150 42 156 31 163 12 163 21 155
Note. The table describes the sample, which covers the period April 2009 to December 2013. Panel A reports observations of European banks that
executed one or more LMEs during the sample period and those that did not execute an LME during the sample period. Panel B focuses on banks-years
only. Panel C reports the number of instruments that were involved in LMEs – each number represents a contract governing an instrument. Panel D
shows the coverage of the sample banks measured by consolidated total assets, compared to the total assets of consolidated banking data reported
by the ECB. Panel E reports bank-years with complete accounting information. Of the column pairs, the left-hand number shows bank-years in which a
bank did execute an LME; the right-hand number shows sample bank-years without an LME.
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Table 3. Characteristics of sample banks 2009–2013.
Panel A: Ever LME (no. of obs: 330)
Means p (diff) p1 p5 p25 p50 p75 p95 p99
Net income (Me) −92.2 0.01 −10,811 −4,211 −461 82.0 640 3,590 6,271
ROA (%) −0.53 0.00 −11.0 −4.22 −0.47 0.15 0.35 0.83 2.99
Solvency (%) 5.30 0.00 0.00 0.80 3.50 5.10 6.50 10.1 17.0
Tier 1 ratio (% of RWA) 10.3 0.00 0.00 6.65 8.30 10.1 12.5 15.5 18.3
AQ (%) 1.58 0.08 0.00 0.12 0.45 0.95 1.67 4.90 11.5
Cash 0.04 0.09 -1.94 -1.52 -0.65 -0.04 0.70 1.74 2.23
Density ( RWATA ) (%) 49.7 0.04 19.7 23.7 33.5 49.5 61.2 82.7 91.3
Beta 0.98 0.00 0.24 0.33 0.76 0.92 1.25 1.55 1.90
Market to Book 0.64 0.11 0.00 0.16 0.38 0.61 0.85 1.31 2.31
BIS ratio (%) 12.8 0.00 0.20 9.32 11.0 12.8 14.4 17.1 19.0
Equity (Me) 14,760 0.00 −2,463 320 1,748 5,971 17,440 66,308 85,886
Total assets (Me) 325,947 0.00 2,677 10,499 42,147 110,742 399,220 1,550,903 1,899,419
Never LME (no. of obs: 457)
Means p1 p5 p25 p50 p75 p95 p99
Net income (Me) 263 −1,800 −299 1.33 31.2 203 2,310 4,973
ROA (%) −0.02 −10.4 −2.60 0.08 0.32 0.70 1.27 3.22
Solvency (%) 8.80 0.00 2.10 4.60 7.30 11.0 17.0 58.8
Tier 1 ratio (% of RWA) 11.9 4.00 4.00 8.85 11.2 14.5 19.9 25.3
AQ (%) 1.42 0.00 0.01 0.28 0.70 1.68 4.64 11.4
Cash 0.17 -2.10 -1.65 -0.55 0.11 0.92 2.03 3.89
Density ( RWATA ) (%) 44.0 14.0 17.7 24.8 36.1 49.4 136 268
Beta 0.49 0.03 0.09 0.28 0.46 0.63 1.08 1.27
Market to Book 0.71 0.00 0.04 0.14 0.54 0.95 2.13 3.43
BIS ratio (%) 15.1 9.5 10.1 12.7 14.1 16.9 21.6 24.8
Equity (Me) 4,794 −0.19 25.7 150 1,026 2,794 18,263 87,981
Total assets (Me) 106,520 122 236 1,407 11,833 77,049 1,899,419 1,933,861
All (no. of obs: 787)
Mean p1 p5 p25 p50 p75 p95 p99
VIX 19.1 13.1 13.3 14.9 16.7 21.1 33.5 36.3
Panel B: LME bank-year (no. of obs: 121)
Means p (diff) p1 p5 p25 p50 p75 p95 p99
Pay-out (previous yr.) (%) 44.9 0.00 0.00 0.00 16.1 46.7 64.9 100 100
Pay-out (current yr.) (%) 39.4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 37.8 67.9 100 100
Non-LME bank-year (no. of obs: 666)
Means p1 p5 p25 p50 p75 p95 p99
Pay-out (previous yr.) (%) 25.9 0.00 0.00 0.00 25.1 41.4 68.8 97
Pay-out (current yr.) (%) 23.5 0.00 0.00 0.00 23.5 36.8 65.9 97
Note. The table reports descriptive statistics, separately for European banks that did (and did not) engage in LMEs, over the period April 2009–
December 2013. Ever LME (Never LME) denotes banks that did (did not) engage in LMEs. The table reports 330 bank-year observations from
69 banks with, and 457 bank-year observations from 98 banks without LMEs. p1, p5, p25, p50, p75, p95, p99 indicate percentile values for percentiles
1, 5, 25, 75, 95, and 99 and the median (p50). p (diff) indicates the significance of the differences in means of variables reported in the upper and lower
part of each panel. Net income is the income the bank realized over the fiscal year. ROA is net income over average total assets. Solvency is lagged
accounting equity divided by lagged total assets. Tier 1 ratio is the lagged Tier 1 capital ratio. AQ is the asset quality of the bank, measured as the
loan loss provision over the amount of net loans. Cash is net cash over Total assets, standardised. Density is the lagged ratio of risk-weighted assets
over total assets. Beta is a bank’s stock beta, estimated using 60 monthly observations of bank returns and the Datastream EU market index. Market
to Book is the lagged ratio of the bank’s market value over the value of book equity. Equity is common shareholders’ equity. Total assets is the book
value of total assets. Pay-out is the dividend pay-out ratio. VIX is the closing value of the CBOE Volatility Index.
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Table 4. European Liability Management Exercises 2009–2013.
Panel A: Descriptives of buyback premiums (no. of transactions: 720) and annual gains and costs (no. of bank-years: 121)
Means p-value p1 p5 p25 p50 p75 p95 p99
Buyback premium (pi in %) 8.22 0.00 −1.39 −0.57 2.29 5.06 10.3 29.2 65.9
Potential gain (in bp of assets) 20.0 0.00 0.20 0.45 2.44 7.73 19.5 69.5 248
Actual gain (in bp of assets) 14.3 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.15 4.81 14.1 45.8 203
Cost (in bp of assets) 5.66 0.00 −0.34 0.03 0.51 1.97 4.85 26.9 49.6
Potential gain (in bp of RWA) 29.2 0.00 0.03 0.53 4.50 16.0 33.7 107 334
Actual gain (in bp of RWA) 21.8 0.00 −0.03 0.00 2.17 9.33 20.8 64.4 327
Cost (in bp of RWA) 7.35 0.00 −0.64 0.05 1.11 3.70 8.20 31.0 52.8
Potential gain (in bp of equity) 505 0.00 0.46 6.20 40.2 148 395 1,816 9,747
Actual gain (in bp of equity) 390 0.00 −0.49 0.00 19.5 97.4 279 1,288 9,548
Cost (in bp of equity) 115 0.00 −17.2 0.14 11.8 48.9 93.6 528 1,355
Discount 0.28 0.00 0.78 0.70 0.48 0.26 0.07 -0.00 -0.03
Panel B: Characteristics of LME transactions (no. of transactions: 720)
Eligibility Premium (pi) in p (diff) Offered(Me) Mean potential Inefficiency (%)
% of nominal (p-value) gain (%) = PremiumPotential gain
Tier 1 11.32
0.19
373 44.9 25.2
Upper Tier 2 9.87
0.00
301 41.8 23.6
Lower Tier 2 5.59
0.02
366 28.0 20.0
Unsecured debt 2.48 762 17.3 14.3
Means 8.22 (0.00) 383 35.8 23.0
Eligibility ∆Reg. cap. Success rate (%) # Instruments
Exchanged (Me)
Tier 1 187 54.0 280
Upper Tier 2 161 53.5 97
Lower Tier 2 179 52.8 302
Unsecured debt 392 51.0 41
Means 192 53.2 720
Note. The table shows descriptive statistics of 720 European LMEs over the period April 2009 to December 2013, involving 121 bank-years. p1, p5,
p25, p50, p75, p95, p99 indicate percentile values for percentiles 1, 5, 25, 75, 95, and 99 and the median (p50). pi is the mean buyback premium:
PX −PA, where PX is the exchange price of the instrument expressed as a percentage of the nominal value of the instrument; PA is the price of the
instrument before the announcement, also expressed in a percentage of the nominal value of the instrument (PN). Potential gain is the potential fair
value gain that a bank could realize in a LME, based on the pre-announcement price of the nominal amount exchanged. Actual gain is the pre-tax fair
value gain that a bank realized in a LME, based on the exchange price of the nominal amount exchanged. Discount is 1 minus the pre-announcement
price expressed as a fraction of the face value of the bought-back instrument: 1−PA. Cost is the difference between potential gain and actual gain. The
denominators assets, risk weighted assets (RWA), and equity in Panel A are lagged. p (diff) tests the difference between the two values reported to the
left of this statistic. p-value tests the mean being 0. Offered is the mean amount the bank announces in the Liability Management Exercise. Inefficiency
is the ratio of cost over potential gain. Exchanged is the mean nominal underlying the bank bought back in the Liability Management Exercise. ∆Reg.
cap.: the italic font denotes the mean loss of total regulatory capital resulting from the LME. Success rate is the mean of the ratio of exchanged over
offered. Instruments is the number of instruments exchanged.
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Table 5. European Liability Management Exercises years, countries.
Panel A: Gains and losses per year (amounts in Me)
Year pi (%) Potential gain Actual gain Cost Inefficiency (%) Offered −∆ Reg. cap. Bank-years
2009 10.06 9,002 6,814 2,188 24.3 33,982 19,278 25
2010 5.23 8,928 7,816 1,112 12.5 39,996 21,019 13
2011 7.10 12,641 9,871 2,770 21.9 70,856 35,375 36
2012 9.16 10,120 7,504 2,616 25.8 91,305 29,960 51
2013 9.60 859 439 420 48.9 15,715 5,305 18
Overall 8.22 41,550 32,443 9,107 21.9 251,854 110,937 143
Panel B: Gains and losses per country (amounts in Me)
Country pi (%) Potential gain Actual gain Cost Inefficiency (%) Offered −∆ Reg. cap. Bank-years
Austria 6.63 845 699 147 17.4 4,913 2,599 6
Belgium 15.67 969 735 235 24.3 2,126 1,775 3
Cyprus 3.00 151 141 9 6.0 413 314 1
Denmark 4.69 51 46 5 9.8 675 149 2
France 6.13 4,189 3,279 909 21.7 33,194 12,147 15
Germany 8.25 1,894 1,514 380 20.1 10,049 4,774 4
Greece 20.07 1,342 953 389 29.0 5,271 2,201 8
Ireland 4.34 11,109 10,083 1,025 9.2 28,573 18,024 11
Italy 4.23 3,815 2,961 853 22.4 60,159 14,723 17
Luxembourg 3.41 31 24 6 19.4 698 188 1
Netherlands 7.45 2,451 1,683 767 31.3 17,583 10,396 9
Portugal 22.67 1,493 911 582 39.0 5,951 2,119 6
Slovenia 7.43 1 1 0 0.0 100 1 1
Spain 10.93 3,478 1,800 1,678 48.2 35,305 14,282 31
Sweden 12.33 185 132 53 28.6 975 535 1
United Kingdom 6.94 9,548 7,480 2,068 21.7 45,869 26,711 27
Aggregate 8.22 41,550 32,443 9,107 21.9 251,854 110,937 143
Note. The table shows amounts involved in European LMEs over the period April 2009 to December 2013. pi is the mean buyback premium: PX −PA,
where PX is the exchange price of the instrument expressed as a percentage of the nominal value of the instrument; PA is the price of the instrument
before the announcement, also expressed in a percentage of the nominal value of the instrument (PN). Potential gain is the maximum potential gain
that a bank could realize in a LME, based on the pre-announcement price of the nominal amount exchanged, pre-tax. The Actual gain is the pre-tax
gain that a bank realized in a LME, based on the exchange price of the nominal amount exchanged. Cost is the difference between Actual gain and
Potential gain. This is a measure of the cost of the LME. Inefficiency is the ratio of Cost over Potential gain. Offered is the amount the bank announces
in the buyback offer, in millions of e. −∆ Reg. cap. is the negative change in total regulatory capital resulting from the LME. Bank-years is the number
of sample bank-year observations.
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Table 6. Correlations for bank-years.
Bank-year obs. (n = 645) LME SolvEquity SolvTier 1 Size Pay-out ROA GIIPS Listed Trading
SolvEquity −0.20
SolvTier 1 −0.15 0.40
Size 0.28 −0.64 −0.29
Pay-out 0.09 −0.03 −0.07 0.03
ROA −0.05 0.11 0.07 0.01 0.03
GIIPS 0.19 −0.06 −0.24 0.11 0.14 −0.20
Listed 0.00 0.23 0.03 −0.15 0.11 0.05 −0.02
Trading 0.29 −0.08 −0.02 0.07 −0.02 0.00 0.01 −0.21
Retail 0.39 −0.09 0.00 0.07 −0.04 −0.11 0.03 −0.33 0.23
Note. The table reports correlations of variables from European LME data over the period April 2009 to December 2013. LME is 1 if a bank
engages in an LME during a fiscal year, else it is 0. SolvEquity is accounting equity divided by total assets. SolvTier 1 is Tier 1 capital divided
by risk-weighted assets. Size is the natural log of total assets in millions of euros. Pay-out is dividend as a proportion of net income. ROA
is net income over total assets. GIIPS is an indicator for LMEs from Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. Listed indicates whether the
bank is listed on a stock exchange. Business model is either “Retail-funded” or “Trading” based on the average values for gross loans and
interbank borrowing. Except for GIIPS, the variables are lagged variables.
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Table 7. LME model (first stage)
β p β p
SolvEquity (−) −5.55 0.00
SolvTier 1 (−) −6.88 0.00
Size (+) 0.25 0.00 0.28 0.00
Pay-out (+) 0.17 0.00 0.19 0.00
ROA (−) −0.21 0.24 −0.19 0.24
GIIPS (+) 0.73 0.00 0.62 0.00
Listed 1.31 0.00 1.25 0.00
Trading 2.99 0.00 3.08 0.00
Retail 2.92 0.00 3.07 0.00
Intercept −5.15 0.00 −5.03 0.00
Pseudo-R2 0.39 0.38
Wald χ2 111 138
Prob. > χ 0.00 0.00
Correctly classified (%) 89.0 87.3
No. of obs. 762 645
Note. The table reports results of a probit regression that relies on European LME data over the period April
2009 to December 2013. The dependent variable is 1 if a bank engages in an LME during a fiscal year, else the
dependent variable is 0.
LME[0,1] =β0 +β1Solvency +β2Size+β3Pay-out +β4ROA+β5GIIPS+β6Listed+ 8∑
n=7βnBusiness model +ε
SolvEquity is accounting equity divided by total assets. SolvTier 1 is Tier 1 capital divided by risk-weighted assets.
Size is the natural log of total assets in millions of euros. Pay-out is dividend as a proportion of net income. ROA is
net income over total assets. GIIPS is an indicator for Liability Management Exercises from Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Portugal, and Spain. Listed indicates whether the bank is listed on a stock exchange. Business model is either
“Retail-funded” or “Trading” based on the average values for gross loans and interbank borrowing. Pseudo-R2 is
McFadden’s pseudo-R2. Except for GIIPS, the regressors are lagged variables to respect the order of causality.
The regression model relies on p-values that account for two-dimensional within-cluster correlation (Petersen,
2009).
43
Table 8. Correlations for LMEs at instrument level.
Individual LMEs (n = 493) pi Tier 1 UT2 LT2 Unsecured V IX SolvEq SolvCT1 Size EBA Recap Target Discount Pay-out ROA
Tier 1 0.27
Upper Tier 2 0.10 −0.30
Lower Tier 2 −0.28 −0.69 −0.33
Unsecured −0.11 −0.20 −0.09 −0.21
VIX 0.25 0.19 −0.03 −0.11 −0.12
SolvEquity −0.21 −0.22 0.03 0.14 0.13 −0.23
SolvCore Tier 1 −0.17 −0.11 0.04 0.07 0.03 −0.21 0.51
Size −0.20 0.00 0.10 −0.07 0.01 0.07 −0.07 0.10
EBA Recap 0.10 0.12 −0.09 −0.02 −0.10 0.73 −0.22 −0.08 0.20
Target1 0.32 0.91 0.06 −0.73 −0.45 0.20 −0.24 −0.10 0.03 0.11
Discount 0.41 0.39 0.02 −0.28 −0.25 0.10 −0.01 0.35 −0.39 0.02 0.44
Pay-out 0.11 0.01 0.01 −0.02 0.01 −0.01 −0.20 −0.13 −0.16 −0.08 0.01 0.06
ROA −0.07 0.09 0.06 −0.15 0.05 0.10 0.07 −0.02 0.40 0.15 0.10 −0.34 −0.07
GIIPS 0.05 −0.16 −0.09 0.15 0.15 −0.26 0.36 0.15 −0.41 −0.34 −0.22 0.07 0.16 −0.18
Note. The table reports correlations of variables from European LME data over the period April 2009 to December 2013. pi is the buyback premium, namely the difference between the
exchange price and its price three days before the buyback announcement, expressed in percent of the nominal underlying value of the instrument. Tier 1 is an indicator variable for exchanged
instruments that are undated, permanent, capital instruments that are senior in ranking to common stock and always rank junior to depositors, general creditors and subordinated debt of the
bank. Upper Tier 2 is an indicator variable for exchanged instruments that are undated, permanent, instruments that are subordinated in full to non-subordinated creditors. Lower Tier 2 is an
indicator variable for exchanged instruments that are dated instruments of which the principal is subordinated to non-subordinated creditors. Unsecured are senior unsecured debt instruments.
VIX is the closing value of the CBOE Volatility Index, standardized to values between 0 and 1, measured at the announcement date. SolvEquity is accounting equity divided by total assets.
SolvCore Tier 1 is Core Tier 1 capital divided by risk-weighted assets, where Core Tier 1 capital is Tier 1 capital net of hybrid Tier 1 capital instruments. Size is the natural log of total assets in
millions of euros. EBA Recap is an indicator for observations of repurchases that took place from September to 7 December 2011.
1 These variables will the referred to in Table 10 below: Target is a categorical variable that increases with the loss-absorbing quality of the instrument. Its value is 4 for Tier 1, 3 for Upper
Tier 2, 2 for Lower Tier 2, 1 for Senior unsecured debt Discount is 1 minus the pre-announcement price expressed as a fraction of the face value of the bought-back instrument: 1−PA. Pay-out
is dividend as a proportion of net income. ROA is net income over total assets. GIIPS is an indicator for Liability Management Exercises from Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain.
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Table 9. Premium model (second stage).
Dependent variable: sinh−1 pi pi
β p β p β p β p β p β p β p β p
Tier 1 (+) 1.46 0.00 1.57 0.00 1.31 0.00 1.34 0.00 8.40 0.00 9.78 0.00 8.14 0.00 6.11 0.00
Upper Tier 2 (+) 1.13 0.01 1.33 0.00 1.12 0.01 1.08 0.01 7.63 0.01 10.1 0.00 8.74 0.00 6.73 0.00
Lower Tier 2 (+) 0.88 0.01 0.96 0.00 0.78 0.01 0.65 0.05 3.09 0.08 4.05 0.06 2.92 0.09 0.45 0.37
V IX (+) 2.47 0.00 2.23 0.00 2.15 0.00 1.85 0.00 15.7 0.00 12.9 0.00 12.4 0.00 10.6 0.00
SolvEquity (−) −10.1 0.00 −63.3 0.01
SolvCore Tier 1 (−) −11.2 0.00 −33.7 0.03
Size (−) −0.20 0.00 −0.20 0.00 −0.19 0.01 −2.44 0.00 −2.44 0.00 −1.86 0.00
EBA Recap −0.65 0.00 −0.40 0.04 −0.51 0.01 −0.19 0.24 −5.81 0.01 −2.83 0.10 −3.48 0.05 −1.15 0.29
Mills’ −0.20 0.15 −0.26 0.07 −0.09 0.30 −0.39 0.01 −3.14 0.09 −3.90 0.03 −2.88 0.06 −2.15 0.04
Intercept 0.00 0.00 3.18 0.00 3.81 0.00 4.66 0.00 1.90 0.00 32.7 0.00 36.6 0.00 30.3 0.00
Prob T1 = UT2 0.30 0.45 0.55 0.41 0.73 0.89 0.78 0.78
R
2
0.15 0.18 0.21 0.24 0.12 0.19 0.21 0.20
Prob. > F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
# of obs. 593 593 593 493 593 593 593 493
Note. The table reports results of a regression that relies on European LMEs over the period April 2009 to December 2013.
pi =β0 +β1Tier 1+β2Upper Tier 2+β3Lower Tier 2+β4V IX +β5Solvency+β6Size+β7EBA Recap+β8Mills′ +ε
For each individual bought-back instrument, the dependent variable (pi) is either the buyback premium, namely the difference between the exchange price and its
price three days before the buyback announcement, expressed in percent of the nominal underlying value of the instrument, or the inverse hyperbolic sine of the
premium: sinh−1 pi or ln(pi+√1+pi2). As the sample used for the regressions contains transactions where the exchanged instrument is a regulatory capital instrument
or an unsecured debt instrument, the coefficient values for Tier 1, Upper Tier 2 and Lower Tier 2 are relative to those of unsecured debt instruments. Tier 1 is an
indicator variable for exchanged instruments that are undated, permanent, capital instruments that are senior in ranking to common stock and always rank junior
to depositors, general creditors and subordinated debt of the bank. Upper Tier 2 is an indicator variable for exchanged instruments that are undated, permanent,
instruments that are subordinated in full to non-subordinated creditors. Lower Tier 2 is an indicator variable for exchanged instruments that are dated instruments
of which the principal is subordinated to non-subordinated creditors. VIX is the closing value of the CBOE Volatility Index, standardized to values between 0 and 1,
measured at the announcement date. SolvEquity is accounting equity divided by total assets. SolvCore Tier 1 is Core Tier 1 capital divided by risk-weighted assets, where
Core Tier 1 capital is Tier 1 capital net of hybrid Tier 1 capital instruments. Size is the natural log of total assets in millions of euros. EBA Recap is an indicator for
observations of repurchases that took place from September to 7 December 2011. Mills’ is the inverse Mills ratio. The regression model relies on p-values that account
for two-dimensional within-cluster correlation (Petersen, 2009).
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Table 10. Target instruments.
Clustered OLS Ordered Probit
β p β p β p β p
SolvEquity (−) −7.89 0.01 −7.90 0.01 −15.0 0.00 −15.0 0.00
Discount (+) 2.10 0.00 2.11 0.00 2.99 0.00 2.99 0.00
V IX (+) 0.92 0.02 0.92 0.02 1.01 0.04 1.01 0.04
Size 0.08 0.03 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.05 0.10 0.07
Pay-out −0.03 0.51 −0.03 0.58 −0.08 0.23 −0.08 0.32
ROA 11.6 0.00 11.6 0.00 18.4 0.01 18.4 0.01
GIIPS −0.20 0.06 −0.19 0.15 −0.22 0.22 −0.22 0.31
EBA Recap −0.40 0.15 −0.40 0.15 −0.45 0.22 −0.45 0.23
Listed −0.10 0.76 −0.09 0.78 −0.12 0.81 −0.13 0.81
Trading −0.45 0.11 −0.44 0.16 −0.76 0.11 −0.77 0.15
Retail −0.14 0.64 −0.13 0.78 −0.30 0.54 −0.31 0.66
Mills 0.01 0.97 −0.01 0.98
Intercept 1.66 0.00 1.62 0.14
Cut 1 −0.77 0.00 −0.80 0.00
Cut 2 1.17 0.00 1.13 0.00
Cut 3 1.59 0.00 1.56 0.00
R
2
, Pseudo-R2 0.32 0.32 0.18 0.18
Prob. > F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
No. of obs. 593 593 593 593
Note. The table reports results of regression results from European LME data over the period April 2009 to December 2013. The dependent variable
denotes the loss-absorbing quality of the repurchased instrument: 4 for Tier 1, 3 for Upper Tier 2, 2 for Lower Tier 2, 1 for Senior unsecured debt.
T[1..4] = β0 +β1Solvency +β2Discount +β3VIX +β4Size+β5Pay-out +β6ROA+β7GIIPS+
β8EBA Recap+β9Listed+ 11∑
n=10βnBusiness model +β12Mills′ +ε
SolvEquity is accounting equity divided by total assets. Discount is 1 minus the pre-announcement price expressed as a fraction of the face value
of the bought-back instrument: 1−PA. VIX is the closing value of the CBOE Volatility Index, standardized to values between 0 and 1, measured at
the announcement date. Size is the natural log of total assets in millions of euros. Pay-out is dividend as a proportion of net income. ROA is net
income over total assets. GIIPS is an indicator for Liability Management Exercises from Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. Listed indicates
whether the bank is listed on a stock exchange. Business model is either “Retail-funded” or “Trading” based on the average values for gross loans and
interbank borrowing. Pseudo-R2 is McFadden’s pseudo-R2. The clustered OLS model relies on p-values that account for two-dimensional within-cluster
correlation (Petersen, 2009).
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Figure 1: The value of debt: the graph follows the function
D
K
= A
K
N(−d1)+ e−rtN(d2), where
d2 = d1 −σ√t, d1 = ln( AK )+(r+σ2/2)tσ√t , A is total assets, K the face value of debt as a fraction
of total assets times 100, r the risk-free rate, and t the duration of debt. N(d) is the probability
that a standard normal random variable will be less than or equal to d. The figure assumes the
following parameter values: t is 2.5 years – assuming average maturity of a 5-year Tier 2 hybrid
capital security. The risk-free rate: r = 1.0%, annual standard deviation σ = 20.0%.
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Appendix 1
Merton (1974) allows us to illustrate why debt holders would command a premium for selling their instrument
back to a bank by demonstrating that the value of debt (D) can be expressed as
D = AN(−d1)+Ke−rtN(d2), (5)
where A is the asset value of the bank, K the face value of debt, r the risk-free rate, and t the duration of debt.
N(d) is the probability that a standard normal random variable will be less than or equal to d:
d1 = ln( AK )+(r+σ2/2)tσ√t
d2 = d1−σ√t. (6)
Dividing Equation (5) by the face value of debt (K) allows us to show the effect of deleveraging, see Figure 1.
The graph in Figure 1 shows that debt reduction (a move along the graph to the right) leads to an increase in
the value of the remaining debt relative to its face value.
[Figure 1 about here]
According to Admati et al. (2017), holders of bank debt will command a premium (pi) to part from their
instrument, where pi=PX −PA. PX is the exchange price paid for the bought-back instrument, PA is its fair value
before the buyback announcement. Aware of the post-buyback value of debt, holders of debt instruments will
command a buyback premium that varies inversely with solvency, as demonstrated by the graph.
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